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Abstract
In this paper we show that individual preferences for immigration are also shaped
by speciﬁc non-economic factors. In order to account for non-economic diﬀerences in a
broader sense, we rely on linguistic relativity hypothesis according to which diﬀerences
in grammatical structures may induce speakers of distinct languages to conceptualize
and experience the world diﬀerently (Sapir, 1921; Whorf and Carroll, 1964). Linguistic
variation is measured by means of a speciﬁc linguistic marker based on the number of
grammatical categories (moods) concerned with the expression of uncertainty. We show
that more intensive users of these speciﬁc grammatical forms are signiﬁcantly more
intolerant toward immigration with respect to other identical individuals speaking a
diﬀerent language/s. This can be attributed to unobserved general attitudes towards
risk and uncertainty, since the linguistic marker strongly correlates with the individuals'
level of risk aversion (Kovacic et al., 2015). The results are robust to the inclusion of
additional set of explanatory and control variables,country and year ﬁxed eﬀects, and
alternative samplings.
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1 Introduction
The debate over immigration is now a prominent issue in many European countries. On
the beginning of 2016, the number of people living in the EU-28 who were citizens of non-
member countries was 20.7 million while the number of people living in the EU-28 who had
been born outside of the EU was 35.1 million.1 The involvement of immigrants in urban
unrest and the growing body of evidence on their poor integration outcomes in employment,
education and health have contributed to increase the interest of policy makers.
One of the barriers to social integration is the negative attitude of the receiving popu-
lations toward immigrants. Some countries are persistently more reluctant to immigration
while others remain more tolerant. According to Eurobarometer (2016)2, in 2016, 58% of
respondents in western and eastern European countries expressed a negative opinion about
immigration from outside the EU. Conversely, only 35% of European respondents have a
negative opinion about immigration of people from other EU Member States. Across the
EU-28, a negative attitude toward immigrants from outside Europe was widely shared by
respondents, especially in Latvia (86%), Slovakia (84%), and Hungary (83%). Sweden stands
out as the most tolerant country with 62% of respondents very tolerant toward immigration.
While opposition to immigration and immigrant integration persist to a diﬀerent extent in
several European countries, the causal evidence to explain such patterns in the public opinion
is quite weak.
The empirical and theoretical literature has recently attempted to investigate what drives
individual perceptions over immigration focusing on economic and non-economic factors3.
While there is a broad consensus on the importance of income endowments and occupational
status, skill levels, and educational attainments, the way in which the non-economic factors
are conceptualized and measured still remains a matter of debate.
1See for instance: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_
and_migrant_population_statistics
2Eurobarometer in collaboration with European Social Survey (ESS) provide comparative data on opin-
ions and social attitudes across EU Member States. The surveys assessed the attitudes of the majority popu-
lation towards minorities according to the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with certain statements re-
lated to immigration. See http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb85/eb85_anx_en.pdf.
3See Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) for a complete review of the literature.
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In this paper we propose an innovative approach to address the role of speciﬁc non-
economic factors in explaining individual preferences over immigration in receiving countries.
The element of novelty lies in introducing linguistic variation as a potential channel to explain
the determinants of attitudes toward immigration, across and within countries. The approach
adopted in this paper is based on Sapir (1921) and Whorf and Carroll (1964) hypothesis,
according to which linguistic diﬀerences in grammatical structures may induce speakers of
diﬀerent languages to conceptualize and experience the world in a diﬀerent way. If individuals
tend to think and behave diﬀerently depending on the characteristics of the language they
use, some dimensions of linguistic structures (grammatical categories) may also shape the
individual's perception of immigration. The idea is that linguistic variation does not inﬂuence
directly the individual attitudes toward immigration, but it does so through its impact on
other individual-speciﬁc traits possibly related to the immigration phenomenon, such as their
general preferences over risk and uncertainty.
In order to account for linguistic variation and its magnitude within and across countries
and regions in this speciﬁc context, we make use of the linguistic marker developed in Kovacic
et al. (2015) based on the number of contexts concerned with the expression of possible or
hypothetical situations in which speciﬁc non-indicative moods (i.e. subjunctive, conditional,
etc.) are used. Since indicative generally asserts that something is true, then according to
linguistic relativity hypothesis, the perceived degree of uncertainty should be larger with
a non-indicative mood compared to an indicative one. Therefore, speakers of languages
where non-indicative moods are used more often to describe hypothetical situations, should
experience the world as being more mutable and uncertain compared to speakers of languages
where these forms are less frequent, ceteris paribus. The linguistic marker developed in
Kovacic et al. (2015) seems suitable for our analysis for two main reasons. First, it strongly
correlates with the individual level of risk aversion.4 Second, language is exogenous and
represent a very slowly changing individual trait. It is not a matter of choice, rather it is
4Another useful reference for the empirical assessment of relationship between language and economic
behavior is Chen (2013) based on diﬀerent linguistic categorization (futurity) in a diﬀerent economic context
(savings and healthy behavior).
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given and it is not inﬂuenced by immigration itself.
Using individual data from 31 European countries (and Israel) speaking 29 diﬀerent lan-
guages, we estimate the determinants of economic and non-economic concerns related to
immigration, and ﬁnd that, ceteris paribus, speciﬁc non-economic factors approximated by
linguistic markers play an important role in the determination of individual degree of toler-
ance toward immigration. In particular, individuals speaking languages where non-indicative
moods are used more intensively, thus reﬂecting a higher risk aversion, are on average more
concerned about economic and cultural aspects of immigration phenomenon, compared to
similar individuals speaking languages where these forms are used less frequently. Moreover,
these individuals also have a more pronounced negative opinion about immigration policy
related to the the number of immigrants of the same or diﬀerent race, or from poor non-EU
countries (Card et al. (2012)).
This result holds both across countries and within linguistically heterogeneous countries.
Since more intensive users of non-indicative moods are on average more uncertain and risk
averse (Kovacic et al. (2015)), and preferences toward immigration may in part depend on
the individuals' general risk preferences, these individuals may also be more more reluctant
to immigration.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section brieﬂy summarizes
the literature on the determinants of individual attitudes toward immigration and introduces
the concept of linguistic relativity. Section 3 presents our linguistic marker and describes
the variables and the data used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 explains the estimation
strategy and the results, while in Section 5 we present a series of additional robustness checks.
Section 6 concludes.
2 On the Determinants of Preferences for Immigration
and Linguistic Relativity
An extensive literature has analyzed the potential determinants of individual preferences
over immigration, reaching diﬀerent conclusions on the role played by economic and so-
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cial factors (see, for instance, Scheve and Slaughter (2001); Gang et al. (2002); Fertig and
Schmidt (2002); Mayda (2006); Facchini and Mayda (2009)). Some work exclusively focus
on economic factors (for instance, Scheve and Slaughter (2001)), while others (Mayda (2006);
Facchini and Mayda (2008), Facchini and Mayda (2009)) investigate the inﬂuence of both
economic and non-economic circumstances in modeling preferences over immigration.
By employing two distinct surveys of data (International Social Survey Programme and
World Value Survey), Mayda (2006) ﬁnds a signiﬁcant correlation between opinions about
immigration and individual skills, i.e., skilled individuals tend to be more pro-immigration
in countries where the relative skill composition of natives to immigrants is high, and vicev-
ersa. Card et al. (2012) use the 2002 European Social Survey (ESS) to analyze the relative
importance of economic and compositional concerns in modeling opinions about immigra-
tion. Their ﬁndings suggest that compositional amenities (i.e., changes in the cultural and
social composition of population in the receiving countries) are more relevant in shaping
variation in individual's attitudes toward immigration than concerns over wages and taxes.
To estimate the intensity of concerns about compositional eﬀects of immigration, they use
a set of questions related to individual's perceptions on immigration policy, customs and
traditions, religion, language, and ethnic composition of population. Their contribution pro-
vides support to the primacy of the cultural over economic concerns in explaining natives'
immigration preferences (Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014)). Using the same data, Sides
and Citrin (2007) show that cultural homogeneity is a stronger predictor for immigration
attitudes compared to economic indicators of vulnerability at the individual level. In the
same vein, other studies emphasize the role of non-economic determinants in shaping im-
migration preferences. For instance, O'Rourke and Sinnott (2006) analyze whether a set
of cultural factors such as strong national identity, patriotic and nationalist attitudes may
aﬀect perceptions over immigration using the 1995 International Social Survey Programme
(ISSP) module on national identity. Their ﬁndings highlight that nationalist sentiment is
strongly associated with individual's preferences toward immigrants, having a large positive
eﬀect on anti-immigration attitudes. Dustmann and Preston (2007) consider the inﬂuence
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of racial-driven concerns in determining attitudes toward immigration. Intolerance may be
shaped by reasons related to cultural and ethnic diﬀerence of the immigrant groups. Racial
or cultural prejudices may severally threaten social integration, inducing social tensions and
costs. Information on racial and cultural attitudes were drawn by a set of questions on
attitudes toward inter-ethnic marriage, have a minority boss, and self admitted prejudice
against minorities5. They isolate cultural and racial concerns as a relevant channel, strongly
correlated with preferences over immigration.
Although this evidence shows that diﬀerences in non-economic characteristics may repre-
sent an important driver of individual preferences over immigration, the inability to identify
a source of exogenous variation for such traits has considerably limited the empirical litera-
ture from developing clear evidence on the causal eﬀects (Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014)).
In order to address this issue, we propose an innovative approach based on the concept of
linguistic relativity ((Sapir, 1921), (Whorf and Carroll, 1964)) according to which diﬀerences
in the way the individuals are induced to speak may inﬂuence to some extent their perception
and interpretation of the reality, and consequently, have some impact on their preferences
and behavior.
The essential idea underlying the linguistic relativity hypothesis is that diﬀerences in
grammatical structures and/or vocabulary may inﬂuence the way in which we think and,
consequently, behave. As suggested by Sapir (1921) and Whorf and Carroll (1964), the se-
mantic structures of diﬀerent languages can aﬀect the way speakers perceive and interpret the
world they observe. On this view, if speakers of diﬀerent languages tend to think and behave
diﬀerently depending on the language they use, some dimensions of linguistic structures may
also shape their preferences and economic decision-making. The linguistic relativity hypoth-
esis has been interpreted according to two versions. The "strong" one (known as linguistic
determinism), states that linguistic categories control cognitive processes. This version of
the hypothesis, however, has been considered as unrealistic and generally refuted (Pinker,
1994). The "weak" version claims that linguistic categories have some eﬀect on cognitive
domain, particularly with respect to memory and categorization. The latter version was
5Attitudinal data is drawn from the British Social Attitudes Survey.
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taken to be more feasible and has inspired research on topics such as color perception, shape
classiﬁcation, space and time categorization, and recently economic behavior. For instance,
Winawer et al. (2007) show that the level of diversiﬁcation of the vocabulary related to
colors, may inﬂuence the ability of individuals to distinguish between diﬀerent types of the
same basic color. In a recent paper on cross-country diﬀerences in gender political quota,
Santacreu-Vasut et al. (2013) show that pervasiveness of gender distinctions in grammar is
an important correlate for individual perception of the general role of men and women in
the society, which in turn inﬂuences the extent of regulation of gender political quota.
Chen (2013), on the other hand, represents the ﬁrst attempt to investigate the impact of
language diﬀerences on several aspects of individual economic behavior. The author adopts
a future time criterion from typological linguistics discussed in Dahl (2000) and Thieroﬀ
(2000), which separates languages into two broad categories: weak and strong Future Time
Reference (FTR henceforth) according to how they require speakers to mark the timing of
events. Some languages require an explicit verb conjugation in order to distinguish between
present and future event (strong FTR languages), while others allow their speakers to talk
about the future by using the same verb forms as for present events (weak FTR languages).
By adopting the weak version of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, the author hypothesized that
this typological divide has an eﬀect on how speakers conceive time. Speciﬁcally, speakers
of languages that separate the future from the present tense ("strong FTR" languages) are
more prone to dissociate the future from the present compared to speakers of languages that
do not employ that speciﬁc verb morphology when referring to future events ("weak FTR"
or "futureless" languages). As a consequence, this may induce people to perceive the future
as being more distant and, as a consequence, to undertake fewer future-oriented actions
such as saving, smoking, using condoms, accumulating wealth before retirement, and taking
initiatives to enhance long-run health. Indeed, the author's empirical exercise conﬁrms a
strong association between weak FTR and future oriented behavior: speakers of weak FTR
languages save more, accumulate more wealth by retirement, smoke less frequently and are
more physically active.
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Kovacic et al. (2015) consider another aspect of individual preferences and relate it to
a diﬀerent economic context, namely the perception of risk and the propensity to invest in
risky assets. The authors develop a speciﬁc linguistic marker based on the intensity of use
of speciﬁc grammatical categories (moods) in contexts involving uncertainty. In general,
when explaining possible or hypothetical situations, speakers of distinct languages may use
indicative or non-indicative grammatical moods (such as conditional, subjuctive, etc.). Since
indicative moods are usually used to assert that a certain proposition is true (as of the actual
world), when applied to hypothetical situations, the use of non-indicative moods, according
to the linguistic relativity hypothesis, should reﬂect a higher degree of uncertainty. If this
conjecture is true, then, speakers of languages where non-indicative moods are used more
often, should perceive the world as more mutable and uncertain, and, as a consequence, be
more likely to be risk averse with respect to similar individuals speaking languages where
these forms are used less frequently, ceteris paribus. The authors ﬁnd a strong association
between their linguistic marker and the probability of being averse to risk taking.
Individual attitudes toward risk may play an important role also in the context of im-
migration. Risk averse individuals may oppose immigration because of their concerns about
uncertainties associated to the immigration phenomenon, which may be both economic or
cultural in nature. As for any other behavioral trait, measuring risk attitudes is not an easy
task. However, the features of the linguistic measure and the empirical evidence on its asso-
ciation with risk preferences in Kovacic et al. (2015) may represent an interesting attempt
to shed some light on the eﬀects of diﬀerences in perception of risk and uncertainty on the
individual preferences over immigration.
In the next section we describe the data used in our empirical analysis. We also introduce
our linguistic marker and report some summary statistics related to the distribution of the
marker across countries and languages.
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3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
To accomplish our objectives, we use the European Social Survey (ESS), a biennial cross-
country survey covering a large set of European countries (plus Israel) since 2001. The
survey measures the attitudes, beliefs and behavioral patterns of diverse populations, with
particular attention to changes in social structure, conditions and attitudes across European
countries (http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/about/index.html). Our analysis is
based on three rounds (2010, 2012, and 2014)6.
The ESS asks respondents a battery of questions that bear on individual's opinions over
immigration. The questions were asked at distinct levels of generality. Our analysis considers
two diﬀerent dimensions of the respondent's opinions about immigration. First, we focus on
three general questions related to the overall eﬀects of immigration on the economy, quality
of life, and culture:
1. "Would you say it is generally bad or good for (this country's) economy that people
come to live here from other countries?"
2. "Is (this country) made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here
from other countries?"
3. "Would you say that (your country's) cultural life is generally undermined or enriched
by people coming to live here for other countries?"
The questions were answered on a 10 point scale. In line with Card et al. (2012), we have
recoded responses in ﬁve categories: 0-1 very intolerant, 2-4 intolerant, 5 indiﬀerent, 6-8
tolerant, 9-10 very tolerant. In addition, we also consider a dichotomous categorization of
the responses classifying as intolerant all those individuals who are not indiﬀerent and more
inclined to be intolerant, i.e., all those who responded 0-4. We also include in the analysis a
set of questions reﬂecting individual preferences about immigration policy. Recognizing that
6We do not consider the ﬁrst four rounds because the codiﬁcation of the region variable has changed
starting from 2010. Hence, for the sake of comparability, we consider only the most recent rounds. The list
of countries in Appendix.
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individuals may have diﬀerent opinions about immigrants from diﬀerent sending countries,
we focus on the survey answers to these speciﬁc questions:
1. "To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic
group as most [country] people to come and live here ?"
2. " "To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of a diﬀerent race or
ethnic group as most [country] people to come and live here?"
3. "To what extent do you think [country] should allow people from the poorer countries
outside Europe to come and live here?"
The questions were answered on a 4 point scale (from 1 - "Allow many to come and live
here"- to 4 -"Allow none"). In order to make the answers comparable with general, economic
and cultural concerns about immigration, we rescaled the variable such that 1 corresponds
to "Allow none" and 4 to "Allow many to come and live here". Tables 7 and 8 (in Appendix
A) show some descriptive statistics for the entire set of countries and for the subgroup of
individuals living in linguistically heterogeneous countries, respectively.
As for linguistic markers, we adopt the classiﬁcation from Kovacic et al. (2015). The
authors develop a speciﬁc linguistic marker based on the number of syntactic contexts that
trigger non-indicative moods (i.e., irrealis contexts). What grammarians call indicative is
the mood generally used to assert that a proposition is true as of the actual world. In
the following proposition: The meeting has ﬁnished , the indicative mood (Past Tense)
asserts that the statement is undoubtedly true. While in propositions asserting actual or real
situations the choice of mood is not a relevant issue, the distinction between indicative and
non-indicative moods becomes crucial when describing possible or hypothetical situations,
such as: I think that the meeting has ﬁnished . In order to describe this situation, the
English language uses indicative (Past Tense), while the Italian speakers would say Penso
che la riunione sia ﬁnita, by making use of a non-indicative mood (Subjunctive). The main
diﬀerence between indicative and non-indicative moods lies in the fact that they assign,
by construction, a diﬀerent degree of uncertainty to possible situations. In other words,
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when describing possible or hypothetical situations, the displacement of the actual from the
alternative state of facts is perceived as larger when a non-indicative mood is used. Following
this logic, English speakers assign less uncertainty with respect to Italian speakers to the
same hypothetical situation.
There are only six syntactic contexts involving possible or hypothetical situations which
may require the use of indicative or non-indicative moods (but not both). These are also
contexts that, from a cross-linguistic viewpoint, trigger non-indicative moods more consis-
tently:
1. complements of modal predicates (i.e., to be possible, to be likely, to be necessary): It's
probable that action should be taken to improve the well-being of the captive animals.;
2. complements of desiderative and volitional predicates (i.e., to want, to wish, to desire):
I wish I hadn't been late for school.;
3. complements of epistemic (non-factive) predicates (i.e., to think, to believe, to doubt):
I think we should keep a diverse energy portfolio.;
4. complements of emotive-factive predicates (i.e., to regret, to be happy, to be sad): I
regret that this joke has garnered so much attention.;
5. complements of declarative predicates (i.e., to say, to tell, to announce): I said that
one day in my career bad results will come.;
6. the protasis (the if - clause) and the apodosis (the main clause) in a conditional sen-
tences: If he had studied harder, he would have passed the exam..
Each syntactic environment is assigned the value of 1 when a non-indicative mood is used,
and 0 when an indicative mood is required. Adding the values, we obtain an indicator
(ranging from 0 to 6) of how frequently non-indicative forms are used in a language, so that
languages can be ranked according to the parameter of use of non-indicative moods. The
extent of use of diﬀerent non-indicative moods in these syntactic contexts is then used as
an indicator, called Irrealis, of linguistic variation between individuals speaking diﬀerent
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languages. Languages that do not require non-indicative moods in any of the context above
(like English, Danish or Hebrew) are called "moodless" languages.
The linguistic mapping in Kovacic et al. (2015) consists of 39 mostly European languages
(see Table 9 in Appendix). Data on grammatical mood were mainly collected from Rothstein
and Thieroﬀ (2010) which is the most complete typological survey on grammatical mood in
the languages of Europe. 7 For the purposes of this analysis, we use data for 29 languages8.
Regarding the number of irrealis contexts where non-indicative moods are used, in our sample
there are 5 moodless languages, seven languages use non-indicative moods in only two
contexts, and ﬁve languages use the non-indicative moods in three contexts. Finally, there
are 10 languages with four non-indicative moods contexts and only three languages that use
non-indicative moods in all of the six contexts. There are no languages with 1 and 5 non
- indicative moods. Moreover, there are 11 linguistically heterogeneous countries, eight of
which are characterized by two or more languages with diﬀerent number of non-indicative
moods (Table 9 in Appendix).
The linguistic markers are considered both as a limited discrete variable (ranging from
0 to 6)9 and as a categorical variable: 0 - no Irrealis users (Irr_Cat0), 2 and 3 Irrealis -
low and intermediate Irrealis users (Irr_Cat1), and 4 and 6 Irrealis - intensive Irrealis users
(Irr_Cat2). In addition, we also consider separately each class of Irrealis and use Irrealis =
0 as a reference category. Figure 1 shows the distribution of Irrealis in our sample for the
entire set of countries and for the linguistically heterogeneous countries.
7Since not all the data were included in Rothstein and Thieroﬀ (2010), the authors worked out a ques-
tionnaire compiled by a number of linguists throughout Europe. They were asked to provide a translation of
various sentences into their native language and to produce, for each sentence, explanations on which mood
they were using in their versions (Indicative versus Other non-indicative moods to be described).
8The list of languages in Appendix
9None of the languages considered in Table 9 is characterized by IRR=1 and IRR=5. However, from a
linguistic (grammatical) point of view, these values are admissible.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Irrealis. Number of Observations: 112184 (all countries); 37895
(LH countries). Source: ESS (rounds 5, 6, 7).
To control for the individual backgrounds, we include a host of demographic and socio-
economic information. Among the demographic variables, we consider age, gender, marital
status, and household size. Marital status was dichotomized into a binary variable assigning
value 1 if the respondent reports to be "being legally married, or in legally registered civil
union" and 0 otherwise. Household size is a discrete variable ranging from 1 to 10. Socio-
economic variables include education, household income, occupation, being unemployed and
being retired. According to the ISCED-97 classiﬁcation, we consider three levels of education:
1) low education (no educational certiﬁcates or primary school certiﬁcates or lower secondary
education); 2) medium education (upper secondary education or high school graduation);
and 3) high education (university degree or postgraduate). Income information is based
on total annual household income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources.
A measure of occupational status is constructed from the ISCO-08 classiﬁcation. We have
grouped occupations into two categories, named "white collar" and "blue collar", in order
to capture some aspects of the labor market composition. Moreover, we include two dummy
indicators for unemployment status and retirement, and a dichotomous variable indicating
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whether the individual have worked abroad for at least six month.
We also control for health status of respondents introducing information on self-assessed
health and functioning and disability status. Concerning self-perceived health, the following
self-assessed health (SAH henceforth) status question was asked: "How is your health in
general? Would you say it is very good, good, fair, poor, very poor". SAH was therefore
measured on a ﬁve-point scale from "very good" (score 5) to "very poor" (score 1) and
treated as an ordered categorical variable. The use of SAH as an indicator of health status
is supported by evidence which shows a strong predictive relationship between individual's
self-rating of health and morbidity (Ellen L. Idler (1997); Kennedy et al. (1998)). We have
dichotomized the SAH into a binary variable assuming value 1 if individuals declare that
their health is very good, good, and 0 otherwise (see Balia and Jones (2008), and Di Novi
(2010)). As regards functional and mental impairments, respondents were asked to respond
to the following question: "Are you hampered in your daily activities in any way by any
longstanding illness, or disability, inﬁrmity or mental health problem? If yes, is that a lot or
to some extent?" We therefore measure disability by constructing a dummy indicator which
assumes value 1 whether the individual reports to experience limitations in daily activities
(" a lot" and "to some extent"), and zero otherwise.
Self-reported responses on topics such as religion, politic involvement and trust are used
to control for other non-economic determinants of attitudes toward immigration diﬀerent
from those (potentially) captured by our linguistic marker. As regards religion, we include a
dummy indicator to capture the intensity of religion's feelings. The degree of political interest
was measured by individual responses to the following question: "How interested would you
say you are in politics - Are you very interested, quite interested, hardly interested or not
interested at all?". We have dichotomized responses into a binary variable which assumes
value 1 if the respondent reports to be very interested or quite interested, and 0 otherwise.
Trust attitudes were measured on a 10 point scale (from 0 - not trust at all- to 10 - trust).
Individuals revealing values equal or greater than 6 are considered "trustful". As a sample
selection criterium, we exclude respondents whose parents were born abroad from our sample
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(i.e., we exclude the population of second-generation immigrants). In addition, we further
control for belonging to a minority ethnic group within the country.
4 Empirical Strategy and Results
In order to investigate the relationship between attitudes toward immigration and the lin-
guistic marker as a proxy for individual general attitudes toward uncertainty we estimate
the following equation:
ATIi,c,y = α + βIRRi + γXi,c,y + λCountryc + θY eary + i,c,y (1)
where ATIi,c,y is a variable that describes attitudes toward immigration by individual i in
region r on survey year (round) y. We consider the degree of individual intolerance toward
immigration both as an ordinal variable and as a binary coded variable equal to 1 for high
and intermediate degrees of intolerance and 0 otherwise. IRRi is the linguistic variation
indicator for each individual. Xi,c,y is a vector of individual level characteristics; Countryc
are country ﬁxed eﬀects, to control for unobserved ﬁxed diﬀerences across country. Y eary
are survey-year ﬁxed eﬀects to control for country policy changes, which may aﬀect attitudes
toward immigration. In all regressions, the standard errors are clustered at the region level.
In addition to the entire set of 31 European countries and Israel, we also consider a
restricted sample of 11 linguistically heterogeneous countries. In such a way we are able to
compare individuals living in similar institutional frameworks but diﬀering in their linguistic
backgrounds. We correct for the fact that in some countries respondents have diﬀerent
probabilities to be part of the sample due to the sampling design used by applying a speciﬁc
design and population size weights.10 In all model speciﬁcations we control for country
and round ﬁxed eﬀects. As for the empirical strategy, in all regressions with the ordinal
10The design weights are computed as the inverse of the inclusion probabilities and then scaled such that
their sum equals the net sample size. The population size weights are the same for all persons within a
country but diﬀer across countries. These weights correct for the fact that most countries taking part in the
ESS have diﬀerent population sizes but similar sample sizes.
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dependent variable we apply the ordered probit estimation technique, while in the case of a
binary coded dependent variable we use the standard probit estimation. We do not report the
estimated coeﬃcients for some controls (marital status, household size, interest in politics,
health status, working experiences abroad and religiosity) for the sake of space.11 All the
coeﬃcients are marginal eﬀects.
4.1 Perceptions of the eﬀects of immigration on the economy, qual-
ity of life, and culture
Table 1 reports the estimation coeﬃcients from the ordered probit model for the probability of
high intolerance toward immigration. Equations 1-3 consider our linguistic variable (Irrealis)
as a limited discrete variable (ranging from 0 to 6), while Models 4-6 include the categorized
version of Irrealis. We also consider, in Equations 7-9, each class of Irrealis separately and
use Irrealis = 0 as a reference category. The coeﬃcients associated to linguistic markers
are highly signiﬁcant in almost all model speciﬁcations. The probability of being intolerant
increases with Irrealis at a decreasing rate (the coeﬃcient on the squared term is negative
and signiﬁcant at the 1% signiﬁcance level). The coeﬃcient on the second category of Irrealis
(i.e.. Irr_Cat2, two or three non-indicative moods across six Irrealis contexts) in Equation
4 indicates that being a strong Irrealis speaker increases the probability of high intolerance
by roughly 6%. This result suggests that individuals equal in all observable aspects except
in the number of non-indicative moods in their respective languages, have diﬀerent degrees
of general intolerance toward immigration. The marginal eﬀect of Irrealis on cultural and
economic concerns about immigration is somewhat lower (4%) and it is not monotonic. The
association between Irrealis and intolerance is even stronger if we consider all intolerant
individuals with respect to those who declare to be indiﬀerent toward immigration and
those with a relatively low levels of intolerance (Table 2). Individuals speaking intensive
Irrealis languages have on average 22% more chance to be intolerant with respect to low
intensity Irrealis speakers. These eﬀects are somewhat lower in the case of economic (14%)
and cultural (18%) concerns. In Table 3 we restrict our sample to individuals living in
11The regression results including these additional controls are available upon request
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linguistically heterogeneous countries only. Since the incidence of moodless speakers (i.e.,
those with Irrealis = 0) is particularly low in these countries (3%), we do not consider
any categorization of Irrealis with Irrealis = 0 as a reference category. The results are in
line with those in Tables 1 and 2, conﬁrming that similar individuals living in a very close
territorial proximity but speaking languages with diﬀerent Irrealis diﬀer in their attitudes
toward immigration, ceteris paribus.
Females are on average less intolerant than men even though this eﬀect is not very strong
and not always statistically diﬀerent from zero. Only in the case of economic concerns about
immigration, females result more intolerant than men. Higher levels of education are in
general associated with lower levels of intolerance. Highly educated individuals have on av-
erage 8% less chance of being intolerant and roughly 3% less chance of being very intolerant
with respect to individuals with medium educational attainments. In line with the existing
literature we also ﬁnd that wealthier individuals seem less intolerant than poorer ones. Re-
garding the occupational status, being a white collar correlates negatively with the level of
intolerance. Unemployment, on the other hand, is positively and signiﬁcantly correlated to
individual degree of intolerance in almost all models considering the whole set of countries
(Tables 1 and 2). However, being unemployed is important only for economic concerns about
immigration in linguistically heterogeneous countries, with unemployed individuals being by
3.5% more intolerant than employed ones (Table 3, Equation 5). Individuals with higher level
of trust in others are on average less intolerant. Since trust and uncertainty (approximated
by Irrealis) may go in opposite directions, we also considered the interaction between the
individual self declared level of trust and Irrealis (tables available upon request). For a given
level of trust, more Irrealis translates into higher levels of intolerance toward immigration.
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Table 3: Marginal Eﬀects: Probability of being Intolerant toward Immigration: 11 Linguis-
tically Heterogeneous Countries
General Economic Cultural General Economic Cultural
concern concern concern concern concern concern
O. Probit O. Probit O. Probit Probit Probit Probit
Irrealis 0.058*** 0.033*** 0.035** 0.200*** 0.107*** 0.146**
(0.010) (0.007) (0.014) (0.050) (0.027) (0.071)
Irrealis Sq. -0.009*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.034*** -0.018*** -0.028**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.005) (0.012)
female -0.004 0.011*** -0.010*** -0.016** 0.017** -0.020***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Age 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.002 -0.000 -0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
HH Income -0.001 -0.003*** -0.001 -0.004** -0.006*** -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Low Edu. 0.010*** 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.015 0.029*** 0.043***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
High Edu. -0.017*** -0.027*** -0.018*** -0.059*** -0.072*** -0.049***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
White Collar -0.012*** -0.023*** -0.012*** -0.042*** -0.055*** -0.032***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Trust -0.044*** -0.058*** -0.037*** -0.117*** -0.131*** -0.095***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Unemployed 0.003 0.010 0.000 0.006 0.035** 0.000
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013)
Retired -0.001 -0.010 0.001 -0.002 -0.020 -0.009
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010)
Country d. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Round d. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Observations 25819 26096 26070 25819 26096 26070
N. Countries 11 11 11 11 11 11
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Reference categories: Male, Medium Education, Blue Collar, Low Trust,
Employed. Not reported: Age Squared, Marital Status, Religious, Minority, Household Size, Health Status, Working
Experience Abroad.
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Figure 2 shows the predicted probability of very high intolerance toward immigration (based
on the estimates from Table 1) for three Irrealis categories. The predicted probability of
being highly intolerant is 11% (in the case of cultural concerns) and 14% (in the case of
economic concerns) for intensive Irrealis speakers. The diﬀerence in predicted probabilities
is even larger if we consider both high and intermediate levels of intolerance (based on the
estimates from Table 2). Individuals speaking very intensive Irrealis languages have on av-
erage 43% probability of being intolerant with respect to 26.5% for low and intermediate
20
Irrealis users. The predicted probability of very high intolerance toward immigration is even
higher in the case of economic concerns related to immigration (Figure 3).
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Figure 2: Predicted probability of high intolerance toward immigration: general, economic
and cultural concerns.
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Figure 3: Predicted probability of high and intermediate intolerance toward immigration:
general, economic and cultural concerns.
4.2 Immigration Policy Opinions
Tables 4 - 6 summarize the results for individual preferences about admission of people of
same or diﬀerent race and from poor non-EU sending countries. As for general, economic and
cultural concerns, the coeﬃcients associated to linguistic markers remain highly signiﬁcant
for each immigration policy question.
The marginal eﬀect of the second category of Irrealis in Equation 4 (Table 4) suggests
that being a strong Irrealis speaker increases the probability of being concerned about inﬂows
of immigrants who share the same ethnicity by roughly 10%. The association between
Irrealis and concerns about immigration inﬂows does not substantially diﬀer in terms of
magnitude if we consider immigrants from poor non-EU sending countries (table 4, Equation
6). Interestingly, the intensity of Irrealis usage is strongly associated with negative opinions
22
about inﬂows of immigrants of the same race with respect to those of diﬀerent ethnicity
(table 5, columns 1-2, and 4-5). As suggested by Card et al. (2012), this ﬁnding may
be related to the fact that native populations perceive the immigrants of the same race
(predominantly European in our case), as a closer substitutes for their labor opportunities.
A comparison of the coeﬃcients in Tables 4 and 5 (whole set of countries) to those of Table 6
(only linguistically heterogeneous countries) does not highlight any substantial diﬀerences in
terms of magnitude of the eﬀect associated to linguistic marker, for each of the immigration
policy opinion considered.
The estimated coeﬃcients associated to the other explanatory variables are in line with
those obtained in the previous speciﬁcations (Table 1, 2 and 3). Females tend to be more
favourable toward immigration inﬂows than men, while respondents with a high level of
education are on average less intolerant towards inﬂows of immigrants with respect to in-
dividuals with medium educational attainments. In line with the existin literature, being a
white collar worker is signiﬁcantly and negatively correlated with unfavourable immigration
policy opinions. Moreover, high level of trust in others and high level of wealth signiﬁ-
cantly correlate with individual preferences over immigration policy, highlighting a negative
association between these individual characteristics and the reluctance to host immigrants.
In general, the results suggest that even after controlling for the individual income and
wealth endowments, as well as for their socio-economic and health status, education level,
political interests, levels of trust and the intensity of religious feelings, a more frequent use
of Irrealis is associated to higher degrees of intolerance toward immigration. As shown in
Kovacic et al. (2015), this may be due to the fact that intensive users of Irrealis perceive
the world as generally more uncertain, and hence result to be more cautious and reluctant
toward immigration.
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Table 6: Marginal Eﬀects: Probability of being Intolerant toward Immigration: 11 Linguis-
tically Heterogeneous Countries
Immigration Immigration Immigration Immigration Immigration Immigration
Same Race Diﬀerent Race Poor non-EU Same Race Diﬀerent Race Poor non-EU
O. Probit O. Probit O. Probit Probit Probit Probit
Irrealis 0.070** 0.070*** 0.098*** 0.181*** 0.160*** 0.170***
(0.029) (0.010) (0.017) (0.057) (0.027) (0.026)
Irrealis Sq. -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.017*** -0.026*** -0.028*** -0.029***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
Female -0.006** -0.011*** -0.009 -0.024*** -0.026*** -0.019**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
HH Income -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.001 -0.008*** -0.005** -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Low Edu. 0.013*** 0.016** 0.019*** 0.038*** 0.023** 0.024**
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011)
High Edu. -0.021*** -0.043*** -0.050*** -0.064*** -0.096*** -0.084***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
White Collar -0.014*** -0.024*** -0.030*** -0.039*** -0.043*** -0.047***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009)
Trust -0.024*** -0.048*** -0.061*** -0.074*** -0.095*** -0.093***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009)
Unemployed 0.007 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.010 0.050*** 0.041**
(0.005) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.016)
Retired -0.008** 0.002 0.004 -0.017 0.015 0.014
(0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Country d. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Round d. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Observations 26427 26338 26201 26427 26338 26201
N. Countries 11 11 11 11 11 11
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Reference categories: Male, Medium Education, Blue Collar, Low Trust,
Employed. Not reported: Age Squared, Marital Status, Religious, Minority, Household Size, Health Status, Working
Experience Abroad.
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
5 Robustness and Sensitivity Checks
In addition to the subset of linguistically heterogeneous countries, we conducted additional
robustness checks to test the empirical validity of our results. First, we included in the re-
gressions, together with the individual-level controls, two regional economic variables drawn
from the ESS contextual variables data: the log of per capita GDP, and the net inﬂow of
immigrants12. We use per capita GDP as a proxy for the regional level of economic develop-
ment. Concerning the net inﬂow of immigrants, it depends on both the receiving country's
demand for immigrants (that is, immigration policies) and migrants' decisions to move, ac-
cording to political and economic incentives. By including this variable, we account for the
12Net migration is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the number of immigrants and the number of emi-
grants.
26
intensity of the immigration phenomenon, which may inﬂuence the host country's general
attitudes towards immigrants. Since GDP per capita and net inﬂow of immigrants may have
a diﬀerentiated impact on the perception of immigration depending on individual education
level and/or ﬁnancial condition, we interact these variables with the individual educational
attainment (as in Facchini and Mayda, 2009).
Second, we look at alternative sample selections. Some empirical studies suggest that
individuals with diﬀerent levels of education may have diﬀerent opinions toward immigration
(see, for instance, Dustmann et al., 2007; Mayda; 2006). There is an extensive literature
suggesting that highly educated individuals are more favorable toward immigration compared
to the less ones (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Mayda 2006; Citrin et al., 1997; Dustmann and
preston, 2007). A possible explanation is that individuals with a higher levels of education
occupy more skilled positions, which are less threatened by labour market competition from
unskilled immigrants (Card et al., 2012). However, this is true only when immigrants are
on average less educated than natives. While this is valid in some countries, it is not in
others (Facchini and Mayda, 2006). In order to rule out the possibility that our results are
driven by education and, in particular, by some speciﬁc education category, we replicate our
analysis on three subsamples: (i) highly educated individuals; (ii) individuals with medium
level of education; and (iii) individuals with low level of education. 13
Table 11 (in Appendix B) replicates the regression models 1-3 from Table 1 controlling
also for the two regional economic variables. Since immigrants tend to be on average less
educated than natives, for any level of GDP per capita, native individuals with a lower
levels of education (and, hence, less skilled positions), may feel more threatened by labor
market competition from unskilled immigrants, which may translate into higher degrees of
intolerance. A similar reasoning applies to the intensity of the immigration phenomenon
(approximated by the net ﬂow of immigration).
The results in Table 11 show that there is a strong and signiﬁcant association between
Irrealis and the individual perception of immigration, independently of their education level,
13We also run our regression models on the linguistically heterogeneous countries countries. The results
remain substantially unchanged. These regression results are available upon request.
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regional GDP per capita and immigration inﬂows. The magnitudes of the coeﬃcients asso-
ciated to Irrealis are slightly reduced with respect to those in Table 1.
Table 12 (in Appendix B) reports the results for the three education subgroups, respec-
tively. The coeﬃcients associated to Irrealis indicate that in all education sub-categories, an
increase in Irrealis is associated with a higher probability of being reluctant toward immi-
gration, in all the models considered. Interestingly, lower educated individuals result more
concerned with the cultural aspects of immigration and relatively less about its economic
aspect.
Finally, we test whether our results hold true by replicating the analysis on speciﬁc age
subgroups (20-30; 31-45; 46-60; over 60). After controlling for the whole set of individual-
level variables, our results remain in general robust and substantially unchanged (Table 13
in Appendix B). The association between Irrealis and economic eﬀects of immigration is
higher for the youngest sub-group of individuals (aged 20-30), probably because working-
age individuals tend to be more susceptible to labor market concerns. Interestingly, older
respondents (over 60) seem more reluctant to cultural aspect of immigration, compared to
the economic and generale ones. As for individual preferences about immigration policy,
young respondents are on average more concerned about immigrants from same ethnicity,
while older people (over60) seem to be more reluctant to host immigrants from poor non EU
countries.
6 Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications
The purpose of this paper was to investigate the role of non-economic traits related to the
perception of risk and uncertainty as potential driving factors of individual preferences over
immigration. We use linguistic variation as an exogenous proxy for individual non-economic
characteristics and ﬁnd that, ceteris paribus, these traits play an important role in the de-
termination of individual degree of tolerance toward immigration. In particular, individuals
belonging to speciﬁc linguistic sub-groups (intensive Irrealis users) have signiﬁcantly lower
levels of tolerance with respect to identical individuals belonging to other linguistic sub-
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groups. The choice of this speciﬁc marker has been driven by two major concerns. First,
language is exogenous and represents a very slowly changing individual trait. Moreover, it
is not a matter of choice, rather it is given and it is not inﬂuenced by immigration itself.
Second, the linguistic markers correlate well with several individual attitudes, such as the
perception of risk and uncertainty.
The empirical evidence provided in this paper sheds some light on possible policy inter-
ventions, especially regarding the social cohesion policies at the local level. Since there is
a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in attitudes toward immigration across European countries and re-
gions, any policy intervention should be designed to improve relationships between host and
immigrant communities and to promote social cohesion. In countries and/or regions where
the reticence toward immigration is particularly accentuated, local governments should act
in the direction of improving the understanding between host and immigrant communities,
by enhancing the inclusion of migrants in local decision making, transparency of relevant
ﬁnancial decisions and building the bridges between natives and immigrants. All these in-
clusive proceedings should be aimed at reducing the level of fear and uncertainty of local
native populations. Our empirical ﬁndings suggest that, in light of signiﬁcant diﬀerences
within and across EU regions in the perception and awareness of immigration, a uniform
integration framework at the EU level probably is not the most eﬃcient strategy to pursue.
On the contrary, the policymakers should design an appropriate inclusive framework as a
function of general public intrinsic attitudes and concerns about uncertainty deriving from
the presence of immigrants and from the resulting social diversity.
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Appendix A
Table 7: Summary statistics (all countries)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
IRR Moods 2.512 1.636 0 6 112078
No IRR Moods 0.209 0.407 0 1 112078
2 or 3 IRR Moods 0.444 0.497 0 1 112078
4 or 6 IRR Moods 0.347 0.476 0 1 112078
Very Intolerant (general) 0.095 0.293 0 1 106613
Intolerant (general) 0.283 0.45 0 1 106613
Indiﬀerent (general) 0.293 0.455 0 1 106613
Tolerant (general) 0.279 0.449 0 1 106613
Very Tolerant (general) 0.05 0.217 0 1 106613
Very Intolerant (economic) 0.117 0.321 0 1 106996
Intolerant (economic) 0.292 0.455 0 1 106996
Indiﬀerent (economic) 0.237 0.425 0 1 106996
Tolerant (economic) 0.305 0.461 0 1 106996
Very Tolerant (economic) 0.049 0.216 0 1 106996
Very Intolerant (cultural) 0.087 0.282 0 1 107243
Intolerant (cultural) 0.235 0.424 0 1 107243
Indiﬀerent (cultural) 0.205 0.404 0 1 107243
Tolerant (cultural) 0.376 0.484 0 1 107243
Very Tolerant (cultural) 0.097 0.296 0 1 107243
Immigration (same race) 2.812 0.9 1 4 108286
Immigration (diﬀerent race) 2.502 0.915 1 4 108089
Immigration (poor non-EU) 2.38 0.936 1 4 107583
age 48.843 18.775 14 103 111846
age2 2738.113 1886.392 196 10609 111846
female 0.537 0.499 0 1 112078
income 5.176 2.806 1 10 88505
education 0.917 0.701 0 2 111802
white collar 0.651 0.477 0 1 99922
blue collar 0.349 0.477 0 1 99922
education 0.917 0.701 0 2 111802
trust 0.432 0.495 0 1 112078
married 0.488 0.5 0 1 112078
household size 2.684 1.396 1 10 111906
majority 0.957 0.203 0 1 112078
30
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
unemployed 0.052 0.222 0 1 112078
retired 0.277 0.447 0 1 112078
disabled 0.261 0.439 0 1 112078
good health 0.639 0.48 0 1 112078
politics 0.453 0.498 0 1 112078
atheist 0.287 0.452 0 1 112078
Table 8: Summary Statistics: Linguistically Heterogeneous Countries
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Irrealis 2.903 1.041 0 6 37859
Irr_Cat0 0.033 0.179 0 1 37859
Irr_Cat1 0.578 0.494 0 1 37859
Irr_Cat2 0.389 0.488 0 1 37859
Very intolerant (general) 0.082 0.275 0 1 35175
Intolerant (general) 0.278 0.448 0 1 35175
Indiﬀerent (general) 0.312 0.463 0 1 35175
Tolerant (general) 0.281 0.449 0 1 35175
Very Tolerant (general) 0.047 0.212 0 1 35175
Very Intolerant (economic) 0.108 0.311 0 1 35581
Intolerant (economic) 0.281 0.449 0 1 35581
Indiﬀerent (economic) 0.238 0.426 0 1 35581
Tolerant (economic) 0.317 0.465 0 1 35581
Very Tolerant (economic) 0.056 0.23 0 1 35581
Very Intolerant (cultural) 0.077 0.267 0 1 35588
Intolerant (cultural) 0.214 0.41 0 1 35588
Indiﬀerent (cultural) 0.201 0.401 0 1 35588
Tolerant (cultural) 0.402 0.49 0 1 35588
Very Tolerant (cultural) 0.105 0.307 0 1 35588
Immigration (same race) 2.85 0.906 1 4 36080
Immigration (diﬀerent Race) 2.509 0.92 1 4 35921
Immigration (Poor non-EU) 2.355 0.945 1 4 35712
List of Countries: Albania (AL), Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), Switzerland
(CH), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE),
Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Great Britain (GB), Greece (GR), Croatia (HR),
Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Iceland (IS), Israel (IL), Italy (IT), Lithuania (LT), Netherlands
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(NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Russia (RU), Sweden (SE), Slovenia (SI),
Slovakia (SK), Ukraine (UA), and Kosovo under UNSCR 1244/99 (XK).
List of Languages: Albanian, Arabic, Bulgarian, Catalan, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English,
Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hebrew, Croatian, Hungarian, Icelandic, Italian,
Lithuanian, Norwegian, Polish, Portuguese, Russian, Slovenian, Slovak, Spanish, Serbian,
Swedish, Turkish, Ukrainian.
Table 9: Number of non-indicative moods (IRR) by language ((Kovacic et al., 2015))
Language IRR Language IRR Languege IRR
Albanian 3 French 3 Portuguese 6
Arabic (IL, AC) 4 German 2 Portuguese (BR) 6
Basque 3 German (AU, CH) 2 Romanian 4
Belorussian 4 Greek 2 Russian 4
Bulgarian 2 Hebrew 0 Russian (IL, EE) 4
Catalan 3 Hungarian 4 Serbian 2
Croatian 2 Icelandic 6 Slovak 4
Czech 4 Irish 4 Slovenian 3
Danish 0 Italian 6 Spanish 4
Dutch 2 Latvian 4 Spanish (LA) 4
Dutch (BE) 2 Lithuanian 4 Swedish 0
English (GB) 0 Macedonian 2 Turkish 4
English (CA, USA) 0 Maltese 0 Ukrainian 4
Estonian 3 Norwegian 0 Welsh 3
Finnish 2 Polish 4
Notes: LA stays for Latin American countries, IL for Israel, EE for Estonia, AU for Austria, CH for Switzerland, BE for
Belgium, BR for Brazil, CA for Canada, AC for Arab countries and for French speaking North-African countries, USA for
the United States of America.
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Table 10: Distribution of Irrealis by Country
Country Irr = 0 Irr = 2 Irr = 3 Irr = 4 Irr = 6
AL 0 .0043 .9914 0 .0043
AT .0014 .9979 0 .0007 0
BE .0040 .6291 .3655 .0007 .0007
BG 0 .8969 0 .1031 0
CH .0047 .7804 .1921 .0017 .0211
CY .0030 .9965 0 .0005 0
CZ 0 0 .0002 .9998 0
DE .0018 .9974 0 .0008 0
DK .9998 0 0 .0002 0
EE 0 0 .9227 .0773 0
ES 0 .0003 .0819 .9178 0
FI .0548 .9447 .0003 .0002 0
FR .0025 .0005 .9945 .0018 .0007
GB .9916 0 .0079 .0005 0
GR 0 1 0 0 0
HR .0037 .9949 0 .0015 0
HU .0012 .0015 0 .9974 0
IE .9935 0 .0003 .0062 0
IL .5648 .0006 .0012 .4328 .0006
IS .0043 0 0 0 .9957
IT 0 .0165 .0015 0 .9820
LT .0003 0 0 .9997 0
NL .0015 .9983 0 .0002 0
NO .9990 .0005 0 .0005 0
PL .0002 .0002 0 .9996 0
PT .0008 0 .0003 .0008 .9982
RU 0 0 0 1 0
SE .9990 .0002 .0002 .0005 0
SI 0 0 .9933 .0067 0
SK 0 0 0 1 0
UA 0 .0006 0 .9994 0
XK 0 .2421 .7546 .0033 0
Notes: Linguistically heterogeneous (LH) countries in bold (Def: countries with linguistic majority <=
95%). 73% of LH countries have two or more languages with diﬀerent Irrealis. Only three LH countries
have languages with the same number of Irrealis (LT, SK, and UA).
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Appendix B
Table 11: Ordered Probit (Marginal Eﬀects): Probability of being (highly) Intolerant toward
Immigration
Linguistic marker Immigration Immigration Immigration General Economic Cultural
same race diﬀerent race poor non-EU concern concern concern
Irrealis 0.027*** 0.060*** 0.079*** 0.045*** 0.032*** 0.020**
(0.006) (0.010) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Full set of regressors
from Table 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country d. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Round d. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls:
GDP Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Inﬂow Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
GDPxEdu Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Inﬂow x Edu Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Observations 54892 54852 54775 54515 54601 54784
Notes: The method of estimation is Ordered probit. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Reference categories: 0 Irrealis,
Male, Medium Education, Blue Collar, Low Trust, Employed. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 12: Ordered Probit (Marginal Eﬀects): Probability of being (highly) Intolerant toward
Immigration
Education: High Same Race Diﬀerent Race Poor non-EU General Economic Cultural
Irrealis 0.031*** 0.040*** 0.068*** 0.048*** 0.035** 0.013
(0.012) (0.007) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016)
Irrealis Sq. -0.004** -0.007*** -0.011*** -0.008** -0.005 -0.005
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
N. Observations 18007 17988 17916 18586 18680 18545
Education: Medium Same Race Diﬀerent Race Poor non-EU General Economic Cultural
Irrealis 0.066*** 0.062*** 0.074*** 0.060*** 0.036*** 0.028
(0.025) (0.012) (0.020) (0.011) (0.010) (0.016)
Irrealis Sq. -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.010*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
N. Observations 41281 41240 41025 40840 41006 41140
Education: Low Same Race Diﬀerent Race Poor non-EU General Economic Cultural
Irrealis 0.097** 0.094*** 0.102*** 0.036*** 0.026*** 0.037***
(0.042) (0.027) (0.029) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
Irrealis Sq. -0.014** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.007***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
N. Observations 19032 18997 18963 17920 17928 18094
Country d. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Round d. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Countries 32 32 32 32 32 32
Notes: The method of estimation is Ordered Probit. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Additional individual level
controls: age, age squared, female, income, white collar, trust, married, household size, unemployed, retired, disabled, good
health, interest in politics, atheist, not minority. Reference categories: Male, Blue Collar, Low Trust, Employed, Low
Interest in Politics, Intermediate and High Religiosity. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 13: Ordered Probit (Marginal Eﬀects): Probability of being (highly) Intolerant toward
Immigration
Age subgroup:20-30 Same Race Diﬀerent Race Poor non-EU General Economic Cultural
Irrealis 0.060** 0.047*** 0.067*** 0.051*** 0.039*** 0.029**
(0.028) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
Irrealis Sq. -0.007 -0.008** -0.011*** -0.008*** -0.005 -0.004
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
N. Observations 10539 10539 10502 10473 10477 10510
Age subgroup:31-45 Same Race Diﬀerent Race Poor non-EU General Economic Cultural
Irrealis 0.087*** 0.062*** 0.064*** 0.068*** 0.032*** 0.039***
(0.029) (0.013) (0.024) (0.014) (0.011) (0.015)
Irrealis Sq. -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.010** -0.010*** -0.006** -0.007***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
N. Observations 24023 19667 19611 23827 19615 19672
Age subgroup:46-60 Same Race Diﬀerent Race Poor non-EU General Economic Cultural
Irrealis 0.052** 0.049*** 0.068*** 0.047*** 0.025** 0.026
(0.021) (0.012) (0.019) (0.011) (0.010) (0.015)
Irrealis Sq. -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.011** -0.008*** -0.004 -0.007***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
N. Observations 21982 21946 21865 21779 21832 21912
Age subgroup:60+ Same Race Diﬀerent Race Poor non-EU General Economic Cultural
Irrealis 0.063*** 0.090*** 0.122*** 0.065*** 0.037*** 0.041***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.028) (0.009) (0.010) (0.014)
Irrealis Sq. -0.010*** -0.019*** -0.024*** -0.011*** -0.008*** -0.011***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
N. Observations 24855 24790 24649 24259 24419 24413
Country d. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Round d. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Countries 32 32 32 32 32 32
Notes: The method of estimation is Ordered Probit. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Reference categories: Male,
Blue Collar, Low Trust, Employed, Low Interest in Politics, Intermediate and High Religiosity. The estimated coeﬃcients
represent marginal eﬀects on the probability of high and intermediate intolerance. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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